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NATIONAL IDENTITY, NATIONALISM, AND THE
ORGANIZA nON OF THE EUROPEAN UNION'
Antonio V. Menendez Alarcon
Butler University

'I

" .. .1' Europe du XXIeme siecle sera culturelle ou ne sera
pas."

Andre Malraux

ABSTRACT
Based on in-depth interviews and document analysis, this
article examines the relationships between cultural identification and
the process of European integration. It shows that French and Spanish
people's cultural attachments to Europe as a common social
organization is still very limited and reflects a concern for the defense
of a national identity. This research contributes to our understanding
of the European integration and to the theory of cultural identity by
suggesting a dynamic paradigm that articulates the constitution of a
formal organization with the process of cultural identity fonmation.

An analysis of worldwide societal changes at the end of the twentieth century
reveals two contradictory tendencies: tendency toward a global village and cultural
integration, and a tendency toward cultural localism and isolationism as a means of
self-reproduction and preservation.
This process can be observed in the European Union (EU). Numerous
elements of convergence are visible in the mid 1990s at the macro level. but there are
also tendencies to reject integration at the local and national level. In most EU
countries, major changes during the 1980s and the early 1990s structured politics,
social organization. and the economy in the form of deregulation, privatization, and
fiscal reforms.' Today, one can observe similarities in the employment structure
(decline in the agricultural sector, growth in the service sector), similar levels of
education, and similar changes in family structure, as well as transformation of the
political sphere. In this way most European Union member countries have evolved
similar institutions (although these similarities do not imply economic equality or
political consensus).'
Given these common elements, one might expect that a European culture, or
what some observers call a "cultural area" (Smith 1990, 1995), would develop and
would tend to reduce the impact of nationalism in the EU countries, and that

International Journal of Contemporary Sociology' Volume 35 • No.1' April, 1998

---------------------~
58 International Journal of Contemporary Sociology
chauvinistic views would be expressed only by extremist and marginal groups. That
is not the case, however. Ethnic, regional, and national divisions are deeply ~gramed
in most of the European Union' s population. Nanonallsm IS not only an:solated
feeling among small, right-wing political groups but is felt as well ~y mamstre~
Europeans.' As such, it is a mass phenomenon, as revealed by the vonng tendenCIes
observed in the French, Danish, Swedish, and Norwegian referenda, 10 surveys
(Eurobarometer 1994, 1995), and in the debate provoked by the recent accel~ranon
of the integration process, after Maastricht. Throughout the European Umon the
nation-state is still the preferred frame of reference.'
In this article I attempt to draw some conclusions on the ~~act o.f presentday nationalism on the European Union by exploring the SOCIal ~agrnary that
defines national identity and nation6 In particular, I :maJyzo: the .m~festaltons of
cultural representations and concepts that charactenze naltonaltsm 10 the EU 10

I
i
i
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unions: Comisiones Obreras-CCOO (Workers Commissions) and Union General de
Trabajadores-UGT (General Union of Workers). Interviews took place in Andalucia,
Asturias, Galicia, and the community of Madrid. A lotal of 68 opinion leaders (35
in France and 33 in Spain) were interviewed.
I use the term lay people to refer to those respondents who do not occupy
socially recognized positions ofleadership. A total of 72 lay people (36 in France
and 36 in Spain) were interviewed, including individuals from the three main sectors
of the economy (agriculture, industry, and services), equal numbers of women and
men, and three age groups (18-30, 31-50, 51 and older)'

IDENTITY AND NATION

other regions, such as Bretagne, Lorraine, Aquitaine, and Provence-Alpes-Cote d
7
.
Azur were interviewed in Paris.
In Spain I interviewed leaders from the three main national parttes: the

The single market is accepted by many of the people I interviewed,
particularly industrialists and political leaders, as a necessary accommodation to the
economic realities of a postindustrial global capitalism. Other studies (Wright 1990),
reveal that powerful people in the decision-making networks of banks and
corporations almost unanimously support a European monetary system and a
common market, and a majority support lite creation of a centta1 European bank. For
instance, leading European industrialists such as Wisse Dekker, the head of Phillips,
enthusiastically support more economically integrated Europe. In fact, according to
many of the interviewees, the business community played a large part in the framing
of the Maastricht Treaty.
The economic arguments in favor of a European Union are impressive. Much
of the GNP of EU member countries is a result of the internationalization process;
industry depends heavily on export trade with other countries in the EU. The cost of
non-Europe has been calculated often (see, among ollters, Cecchini 1988 and Europa
2000 1992)' These studies suggest that if there was no European Union,
intercommunity business would decline, unemployment would increase, and national
currencies would be devaluated. In other words, the economies of the member
countries already have largely undergone the integration process, especially since the
Maastricht Treaty, which formalized the single market, with its free movement of
goods, capital, labor, and services.
Notwilltstanding, in leadership circles of the European Union it is believed
that these "modem organizational forms of the economic system" require a new form
of political organization (see Cappellin 1993: 7). Particularly, Spinelli (1989), Delors
(1992) and ollters suggest that such an organization must incorporate certain
characteristics of federalism in order to ensure greater decentralization in the
decision-making process, and lItereby to build an institutional form better suited to
the culturally and technologically complex socioeconomic system that already
predominates in Europe.

center-left Partido Socialista Obrero Espailol-PSOE (Workers Spanish SOCIalIst
Party) the conservative center-right Partido Popular-PP (popular Party), and ~e
leftist Izquierda Unida-IU (United Left). The union leaders belong to the two major

area such as the EU has produced feelings of insecurity in many people. Indeed, the
internationalization of production structures and an economy that ignores borders

France and Spain.
.
.
.th
This article is based on several sources, including in-depth mteMews WI
opinion leaders and lay people in France and Spain in the Spring of 1995 and 19%,
field observation, and extensive :maJysis of documents such as surveys: newspaper
articles, and European Union materials. The concept of pohttcalleaders mcludes the
top leaders of a party in the region, most of whom are also Important naltonal
figures; these include general secretaries, member of Congr~, senators, mayors, and
high-ranking officials. The union and busmess leaders also mclude the top leaders
of the wUon or association in each regton.
.
In France I interviewed leaders from five national parties: the center-left P~
Socialiste-PS (Socialist party), the conservative center-right and gaulhst
Rassemblement Pour la Republique-RPR (Alliance for the Repubhc), the center-nght
Union Democratique Fran,aise-UDF, the Parti Communiste-PC (Commurust Party),
and right wing Front National-FN (National Front). The urn?n leaders belong to th~
three major unions: Confederation Generale. des Travall~eurs-CGT (Workers
General Confederation), Confederation Fran,.. se Democrattque. du Trav81l-CFD!
(French Democratic Work Confederation), and Force Ouvnere-FO (Worker s
Power). The business leaders were members of the main French Busines and
Industrialist association the Confederation Nationale du Patronat Fran,81s-CNPF
(National Confederation of French Employers). The leaders interviewed, .throUgh
their functions within their party, union, or business assoclatton, were also hnked to
the establishment of policies regarding the European. Umon. I conducted the
interviews in lie de France (paris and its suburbs), and tn the Haute Garonne (the
majority of interviews were conducted in Toulouse and its suburbs). Leadersfron:

However, surpassing national frames of reference and interacting in a large

:1
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have caused many individuals and companies to enter a difficult international
competition. Many workers have lost their jobs ~ a result ~f adjustments to the
European market, and various co~pani~s (especIally medium-slZed and small
companies) are competing for SurviVal WIth comparues from other EU couotnes.
Pervasive social problems, such as high levels of uoe~ployment and stagnanon In
the standard of living, also contribute to a general chmate of uncernuoty. A: large
proportion of middle- and lower-class people perceive the European Urnon .as
dominated by corporations and big businesses, and see this as detrunental to a SOCIal
Europe. lo
.
The sense of insecurity felt by many Europeans IS also based on the
perception that this overarching organization is a threat to traditions and local
cultures. I I Indeed, the European Union is another manifestation of a recent g1?bal
evolution which is eroding traditional arrangements and tranSforming the foundations
of the society, the economy, political ~tructures, and the int~tional order, and
tends to produce a certain masslficatlon and oft~ uruformtty of pr.oducts and
techniques. This transgression of the tradmonal SOCIOCultural boundaries ~eqUl~es
people to venture out of a national reassuring framework, causing a cnsls of IdentIty
and distress in many who find it difficult to imagine such a pluralistiC c0mn:'uruty.
In this context, people are more and more nostalgic about c~mmuruty hfe,
Idenbty. M~y
and certain traditions, and try to reinforce what they view as their
express a desire to defend their national identity against outsiders, mdudmg m this
perception of "outsider" indistinctly countnes of the European Urnon and. nonmember countries. The following quotes are typICal of the thoughts expressed m the
interviews by those who oppose and those who agree with a federal form of
organization:

lnI:"

" I do not like very much the idea of a federal state because it will ~nd up
eliminating cultural differences. I think each country should mamtam Its own

identity."
"Yes, I would like the European Union to become a federal union because ~e
have the same interests and that will help to reinforce the role of Europe m
the international scene. However, the European institutions should be such
that national identities ,viU be respected."
These statements reflect that a collective cultural identity at the European
Union level is still nonexistent. Although one can infer some rather broad values
predominantly shared by the population of the European Union, such as pohtical
democracy, aesthetics, egalitarian ideology, and peace Ideology, ve~ few ?f the
persons I interviewed were able to mention any cultural symbol shared WIth natIOnals
of other countries in the Union-except for some rather abstract references to the
historical ludea-Christian, Greco-Roman, Celtic, and Arabic influences, and th~
traditional perceptions that eXIsted even before the Urnon, such as the notion tha

Italians are culturally close to Spaniards. 12 The perception of being European is
vague and distant, and the interviewees did not show a European consciousness, a
feeling of being pan of the same community, a sense of belonging. Even high-level
officials such as Carlos Westendorp, Spanish Secretary of State for the European
Union, admitted in a 1994 interview that he felt culturally and emotionally closer to
Latin America than to the other Europeans (£1 Pais 1994b). Although Brussels is
perceived increasingly as a policy-making center in the community, it is not yet the
center for symbols, values, or beliefs.
The national identity that people want to protect has no precise form or
definition, althought it implies a sbong belief on inclusion and exclusion." Everyone
I interviewed mentioned certain values that he or she considered important and
wished to defend in the narne of national identity (whether based on economic
interests, cultural traditions, or xenophobic views). Eighty-four percent of the people
interviewed in France and Spain (including opinion leaders and lay people) believe
that their nation correspond to a natural geographical and cultural division and that
their country have clear identifiable characteristics that differentiate them from other
countries.

Among the national characteristics most often recognized and mentioned by
the interviewees are religion, food, ways of dressing, music, and above all language.
In other words, the basic notion of nationalism, as Edwards (1985) notes, is selfawareness and self-consciousness, and these feelings are explained by the use of
markers such as the ones previously mentioned. Language has a particular relevance
for national consciousness because of the clear cut it offers for people to differentiate
and to express their uniqueness. In fact, almost all interviewees consider langnage
as essential to the maintenance of a national identity. They think that the existence
of the Spanish or French nation relies on having their own language.
Language is for them not only a form of communication, but the expression
of their cultural identity, their specificity and what they see as their unique view of
the world. In other words, language is a symbolic expression ftmdamental as a tool
not only of communication but also for national unity. Indeed, in the context of the
EU it is the most powerful and visible symbolism of differentiation and belonging. I.
A discrimination based on cultural dependence and language is often
mentioned in France and Spain to demonstrate an erosion of cultural identity. People
in these countries perceive the use of English language in the European Union as
imperialistic. As one professor remarked: ''If our language is lost, we erode our own
existence as a distinctive nationality. I do not think it is a question of going back to
the past, but should our future be dominated by other cultural experiences? Couldn' t
we be building the future as well? From our perspective, and not from others
perspectives. I want the Spanish culture to be an option for the future."
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REPRODUCTION OF THE NATION-STATE
IN EVERYDAY LIFE
Participating as a nation in building the future im?lies fo~ a maj?rity of
interviewees a reassertion of national sovereignty by opposItIon to mtegration mto
a federal Europe. In France, for example, we can see the reappearance of old slog~
such as /a France awe Franfais [France to French] or old stereotypes su~h as a
German Europe." People from the democratic left, such as J~-Plerre Chevenement
or Regis Debray, oppose what they call "the mtromlSSIOn ?f the European
technocracy" into national sovereignty (Debmy 1990). Ex-Gaulhst prune mlDlster
of Fmnce, Edouard Balladur, in the newspaper Le Monde (1994), stated his mterest
in limiting the power of the European Union to basic ~ments, and suggested soft
formulas of organization. In this respect, be agreed WIth the euroskeptics of .the
United Kingdom, and with the ultranationalism of the extreme nght-WIng partIes.
One such party, the French National Front, denounced the Maasllncht Treaty as a
conspiracy against la France elernelle [the eternal ~rance] (Le Mond,:, 17-18 May,
1992). Similar views, proposing that national sovereIgnty must pr~d?mmate over any
all-European arrangement, seem to be driving the European poltc.es of the French
president Jacques Chirac, and are expressed by large segments of.the population m
Fmnce, but also in Spain. Despite the differences between the ?ational popuhs~ of
the right and the nationalism of certain sectors of the left regar~g therr percepltons
of what a nation should be, both sides instigate fear and defenSIveness regardmg the
· 15
European U Dlon.
.
Those concerns also bave been provoked by the increasmg scope of EU
policy interests as specified in the Maastricht Treaty. More declSlons are now made
by the EU. National states have lost substantial power in some policy spheres such
as external trade and agriculttrre. The EU also has taken the lead m European
monetary union, institutional reforms, the social dim.ension, th~ smgle European
and cultural policies such as Erasmus and Lmgua, which affect bIlateral
mark e t ,
. .
akin
has bee
relations arnong states. In these areas the declslo.n-m
g process
n
accelerated because the majority vote in the CounCIl has been used much more

. 1 .

~

extensive YlD recent years.
.'
To be sure, a majority of the people mtervtewed would agree to create some
form of European organization" but a large majority feel that the E~pean UDlon
should not be the end of the nation-state as they know .t. The followmg quote from

a French interviewee reflects this view:
"J agree with some form of European organizatio? but not with a federal state
such as Switzerland or the United States of Amenca Such a federal state wIl,:
eliminate the sovereignty of each country, and we can not renounce to that.
The political will to exist as an independent entity predomi~~es . Sixty~three
percent of the people I interviewed (including French and Sparuards) beheve 10 the
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need to keep alive a national political organization and a distinctive national identity,
and they strongly tend to reject a centralizing authority that would try to homogenize
the EU countries. Most Europeans would like to keep independent states within a
general intergovernmental organization with some aspects in common, such as the
defense policy and multinational companies at the European level. This tendency is
also reflected in recent public opinion surveys in the European Union
(Eurobarometer 1994, 1995, 1996).
The areas in which the public is most reluctant to accept union are those
which they perceive as closest to their identity, for instance monetary union. In this
isssue there were significant differences between French and Spanish interviewees,
particularly among lay people. Sixty-four percent of French and 46 percent of
Spaniards would prefer to keep their present currency. Among the opinion leaders
there was a similar appraisal of the issue in both nationalities: 42 percent of French
and 40 percent of Spaniards would bave prefemed a different arrangement than the
model of monetary union that will be applied. When I asked my interviewees wby
they were concerned about a common currency, some offered a rational fmancial
analysis, but the emphasis was more on the symbolic meaning. For instance: "It is
difficult for me to imagine using money which is not the Franc. I feel like something
important will be lost." The franc and the peseta, are symbols of their cultural
distinctiveness and political independence. For the lay people the monetary issue is
more about feelings than about logical economic explanations.
T1rrough the defense of their national identity people try to avoid the forces
that call into question the traditional ways of doing things. Most people interviewed
can conceive of identity only as a form of uniqueness or homogeneity. Because they
cannot reconcile unity with diversity, their reaction is to close themselves to the
outside, as they bave learned to do from generation to generation.
These ideologies shuflle identity, citizenship, and nationality; they equate
culttrral specificit)', political belonging, and national environment. Identity in these
views is the essence of the nation-state. This constitutes an idea that is inscribed in
the social symbolism with force and determination.
The perception of equivalence between cultural identity and nation-state has
been promoted mainly by the governments themselves through education and rituals.
A typology of collective identity has been produced, influencing individuals'
relations with one another and with themselves. Indeed, as Oriol (1979) and others
bave suggested, the idea of national identity is not independent from the management
of culture by the state and its apparatus (the schools, the media, the army) which use
mechanisms of control to homogenize cultures within the national framework. "
Throughout history those who controlled the state believed that any national entity
must be endowed with a sacred unity, which consistently has been presented as a
nattrral social unit. Drawing on traditions (which often were local, not national)
national states bave stimulated ceremonies and festivals that celebrated the higher
historical legacy and values of a given nationality. To paraphrase Hobsbawm and
Ranger (1983), they invented tradition. It is well known that the school system in
evety country of Europe has promoted a culture in which the nation was always the

i
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.
enVlror
unen1. Ev en today . geography is taught in such a way that it. continu
es
. to
reproduce the idea of natural borders between countries, and the natio nal
terntory
constitutes the fundamental space on a vague Europe.an continent. 1be
recrwtinent
of citizen armies also weighted heavily on the formation of an unagma
ry collective
. usness. Sharing war expen'ences generates "cultural menlon es and SOCial
conSClo
institutions, like veterans' organizations" (Schudson 1994:63). Those .tua1
n
s
historically have played such an important role tha~ people sllll find
It difficult to
adapt to the idea that yesterday's enemies are today s fri~nds.
.
' .
In sum, this defensive retreat to a historical traditlOn rests on a natlOnal,sllc
' 1 h'
.d I
that has long been one of the strongest bases for socia
co eSlon. Mt
os
I eoogy
.
.
'd'
Ie still believe that their salvation and therr
well-be mg resl e mastrong
:::~nal state, as they experience and imagine it. This is largely the form of the state
that has existed in Europe since the nineteenth century. The nallon
appears as a
symbol of identification and a gauge of power, unity, and specificlry.
Nallonalls,?
is used as an instrument of self-defense because peo~le be~eve !"ey can
control therr
future better within a given national space. As Demda wntes, 'Nallon
al he~emony
presents itself, claims itself. It claims to justity itself in the name of
a pnv~e~e;.
responsibility and in memory of the universal,,:, ofth. transcendental or
onto ~g1c.
(1992: 47). Furthennore, the nation-state IS VIewed as a commuruty ofsubsu
tullon
between the international structure and market that the EU represen
ts and the
atomize d individual.
.
fth
bols and rituals that contribute to the reproducllon
0
yths
e
Thesem
" sym
.
b t
nation-state are not only an abstract representation of an irnagmary commu
nauty u
are also the expression of concrete social relations.
..
.
Indeed, the national state is still perceived by ,?ost cItizens as a basiS
of
support, and as such represents the social needs of dIfferent SOCIal
groups and
classes. Allove r Europe the etat-providence IS still favored strongly by
the general
population. Even after the neoli beral mood of the 198.0s, p~bhc support
for the
welfare state has not changed much-I ncludin g in the Uruted Kingdom,
probably the
most market--<>riented country in the EU'· Several surveys sh~w
that most
Europeans support public health services, pubhc education, and SOCial
protection.
People associate this safety net with the national state, even though the
Maastn cht
Treaty does include a social charter supportmg the most advanced social
programs
in the EU. Indeed, although the primary purpose of the Treaty (as reflecte
d m the
1992 initiative which was included in the treaty) was to make Europe
an fmos
competitive in'the world economy and thereby to revitalize the Europe
an Uruo~
economy (Springer 1992), this treaty also emphasized reinforcing a " SOCial
Euro';" f
in order to create allegiance to the European Uruon and to generat
e a sens
belonging in the population at large. The European ~ruon w~
already a
businessmen's Europe ; therefore, the Commission felt that ill order to
mtegrate the

general population into Europe, to create a sense ofEuropeanness, a SOClal
Europe

had to be created."

Perspectives from France and Spain 65
Yet, these projects suggested in the Maastricht Treaty are not aknowledged
by the population because they are still in process. The social and cultural
aspects of
integration have not been applied with the same intensiry and speed as
the aspects
pertaining to the single market. Notwithstanding the existence of projects
, people
need to experience the benefits of European integration in their everyda
y lives. Their
attachment to the European Union depends on their experiences with
the concrete
manifestations of the integration process. Indeed, a cultural configu
ration is
detennined by everyday experiences, which include social interactioflS
tied to an a
priori ontological perception and to collective practices that define
individuals'
relative identities. In other words, as a result of the historical cultural percepti
ons and
notions mentioned in previous pages, people living in the EU countrie
s will tend to
favor old nationalistic stereotypes unless strong evidence in their
everyday
experiences suggests other alternatives. And few things in the process
of European
integration have contributed to change these ways of thinking.
Frictions along national lines still predominate in intra-European relation
s.
TIle European Union is a collage in which assertions of national identity based
upon
diversity of interests are the order of the day. It appears to most
people as an
arrangement in which representatives of different nations negotiate to
protect their
national interests. Indeed, in the Council of Ministers, the predominant
decisionmaking institution of the EU, each minister mainly looks after the interest
s of his or
her country." Most politicians are concerned primarily about their voters
at home
and about obtaining seemingly favorable treatment for their country.
Their people
evaluate them on the perceived quality of the deals they obtain. In
Spain, for
instance, people often blame their politicians for not getting enough
from the
European Union, and giving up too much.
This tendency to concentrate on the country's national interests can
be
observed in the alliances that form within the European Union to push
for certain
agreements. These alliances rarely respond to a general, common philoso
phy; they
are based on the short-term, concrete interests of the countries involve
d. For
instance, the countries that form what has been called the "cohesion front"
(Greece,
Ireland, Portugal, and Spain) are more or less united conceming
north/south
(rich/poor) relationships, but this union often breaks down. In late 1994,
for example,
when Spain requested full inclusion in the Common Fishing Policy, Portuga
l (which
was also included in this request) did not fully support Spain because
that country
feared the invasion of its waters by Spanish fishing boats." Gennan y's
dispute with
Luxembourg over fiscal policies is another example of conflicts among coootrie
s that
occasionally seem united. Also problematic are the repeated confron
tations on
foreign policy among all member coootries, and the lack of coordin
ation on
important issues such as the conflict in the fonner Yugoslavia (especia
lly at the
beginning of the war there). In addition, historic , cultural , and econom
ic links
between countries inside and outside the EU are often strong enough
to forestall
economic agreements within the EU. In the spring of 1995, for exampl
e, the British
sided with Canada during the conflict over fishing rights between
the EU and
Canada.24.

i
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The idea of a European Union is revolutionary in the sense that in many ways
it constitutes a challenge to the established thinking, to what already has been done
in tenns of social organization, and to what traditionally has happened in the
relationships between states (no nation has ever willingly consented to give up any
sovereignty to a multinational organization). However, until now, the European
Union has been an arrangement to which states belong because it is better to be
inside than outside, but there is not much politico-cultural identification with the
organization as a whole. Although the specific characteristics oftoday's nationalism
vary from one member country to another, most of the people I interviewed fear the
creation of a "new centralized organization (federal or not) that will decide
everything from Brussels, and will impose a unilateral view" (Interview with a
political leader). The fear of foreign rule is still very strong. Most people in France
and Spain have not solved the contradiction between allegiance to a European
community of nations and what they perceive as the threat of foreign intervention in
their own affairs (other research suggest that this attitude may be applied to other
nationalities within the EU). A majority of the people I interviewed have an idea of
cultural identity which revolves exclusively around the concept of the nation-state
as an imaginary community. Most people have difficulty in giving up an ideology
that characterizes the nation as the sole center of collective identity, that equates
national identity with cultural identity, and that makes political power equivalent
only to the national structure. People from these two states resort to a social
representation of national identity and to an ideological functioning that often
reflects national chauvinism.
In the foreseeable future, the peoples of Europe will continue to be
distinguished by self-government, language, and myths of common ancestry. The
existence of national identities is still a very important matter for most Europeans.
Even if a more highly federated Europe develops, it is unlikely that national cultures
will be absorbed into an embracing, dominant European culture. As a result of the
transnational flows, some more concrete form of European culture may materialize
in the long term, but many years will pass before one can refer to a European culture
as a unifying myth. In the nineteenth century, the federalist Pierre-Joseph Proudhon
(1923) said that Europe still needed many years of purgatory before a federal form
of organization was created. This statement is still valid today.
In brief, the EU is a new social space that is still far from inspiring a new
collective consciousness in the population of France and Spain. As we have seen,
althought some form of organization at the European level is supported by most of
the people interviewed, the idea of a federal form of integration is only supported by
a minority. The idea of a politically united Europe is regarded as very remote, and
most people I interviewed do not believe that it is possible in the near future.
Then, what is the alternative? Are a desire for "authenticity," a search for a
fragile past, and a symbolic reaffirmation of traditional values attached to the nationstate viable today? Should Europe continue to be dispersed into " a multiplicity of
self-enclosed idioms or petty littie nationalisms" (Derrida 1992: 39)? Or should the
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members of the European Union ' create a new imaginary community? In the
followmg section I address these questions.

CONCLUDING REMARKS
The view widely held in France .and Spain that equates identity with nation
(as seen m prevIOus pages) hides histoncal realities. Indeed, national identity is as
much a produ~t and an IdeologJcal creation of the state as it is its quintessence. By
reducmg the diverstty of cul
,denl1t1es to the mythical unity of national identity,

tural

this vI.e:", otruts re~lOnal vananons. socioeconomic differences, and ethnic cultural
plurabtles. It also Ignores the fact that there is no nation in Europe in which ethnic
or regIOnal mmonttes have not been forced, to some extent, to become part of a
umted nal1on. BeSIdes, the cultural order itself cannot be reduced to national
identit.ies, which ~onstitute omy.one level of differentiation (although probably the
~ost lIDportant. ill the pubhc ImagInary). Other spheres of differentiation and
ldennficatton extst; these are tied to people's positions and roles such as social class
ethnic group, and religious and political beliefs. These categories of identificatio~
mayor may not coincide with the nation, the region, or the local community.
BeSIdes, except m the mythical sense, no country has a unique essence. A nation
eXlst~ only as a process; it is always looking for itself, constantly building its
IdentIty.
One must recognize that whether under the umbrella of the EU or not
cultural representations are flowing in and out between nation-states and region~
mo~e abundantly than ever. Undoubtedly this process will produce changes within
national states. Howe.ve~, the weakening of the nation-state and of its ability to
exercISe autonomy WIthin ItS geographical borders is not so much the result of
regulations established .in Brussels as of the increasing power of private
multmatlonal comparues m controlbng the economy and communications.
The EU in fact may help to preserve cultural identity. For instance, the EU
a SpeCIal effort to gIve equal linguistic rights to every country. This is not the

make;;

cas~

in

other In~ernationa1 relatIOnships such as those among private companies,

which are dommated by the use of the English language. In other words the
Ewupean Union is preserving rather than destroying languages within the unio~. As
De W,tte (1993) suggests, national identities may be protected better by closer
formal mteracnons at the European level than by separate policies enacted in each

member state.
The .constitution of a European Union requires a change of ideology among
the populalton which connotes that ''the other has become attractive rather than
repulsive" (Heller 1992, p. 25). The European Union must develop a new cultural
mythology strong enough at least to be associated with the existing national
mY!i'0logJes. On~ can Imagme that the European Union might integrate the various
national and regIOnal cultures in a complementary rather than adversarial form.
Several dIfferent cultures could exist under a general cultural umbrella that would

T68 International Journal of Contemporary Sociology
constitute what we call European culture. People could be loyal to European,
national, regional, and local culture at the same time, as is true today at the national
and the regional levels in certain countries. European culture could be an expression
of several cultures that have some basic eLements in common as a result of exchanges
between them. Together with Spanish cinema, for example, it is important that a
European cinema also exist; that not only French literature but also European
literature exist, and so on.
in sum, the building of a European culture could imply the symbolic transfer
of belonging from the nation to an ever-widening geographical and cultural area such
as the EU, as was the case when nations were built in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries. Indeed, at that time the local residents learned that the motherland (or
fatherland, depending on the country) was not only their immediate environment but
also "something vast and intangible" (Weber 1976: 332) that was called France or
Spain, not Brittany or Galicia In other words, the perception of conununity could be
extended from the local and the national to the vast geographical, political, and
cultural organization called the EU."
Some restructuring of the present organization will probably help to build a
new identity that can deal more effectively with the present international
arrangements. For instance, development of a closer political ideology, created
through morufication of political decision making in Brussels (by giving more power
to the European parliament), and deveLopment of several forms of conunon
communication (such as mass media programs that cross national borders, including
news and entertainment)."
Other aspects that need to be addressed are those pertaining to economics and
social benefits-as mentioned in previous pages, and which have been addressed
eLsewhere (i.e., Hantrais 1995, Hadjimichalis and Sadler 1995, Springer 1992)--and
those pertaining to the symbolic realm and institutional stability. Indeed, to develop
a cultural identification among the popuLation of the diverse countries, the EU must
have a minimum of stability (people need stable patterns in order to function in a
partiCUlar organization). This has not been the case; the EU has been modified
constantly, not only in its functioning but aLso in the number of members. Even the
name has been changed several times.
Furthermore, time is absolutely necessary in cultural identification-time for
people to adapt, to lose fear of the other, to understand in practice how certain
agreements will work, to constitute some form of symbolism. If the EU grows even
larger in the next 10 years, there will not be enough time to allow people to adapt to
tbe EU as an important institution with which they can identify, and to develop a
culturally more integrated Europe. The European Union cannot continue to expand
without deepening. It must build bridges to the outside, but at the same time it should
continue to deepen the relationships among its current members and to improve the
existing institutions. The more countries there are in the Union in the short term, the
less the possibility of developing a cultural identification with Europe. Enlargement
implies not only more conflict and more difficulties in reaching agreements, but also,
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and above. all? the diluting of a European identity. The more the Ewupean Union
enlarges WIth Its present forms of organization, the more powerful the nation-states
Wlll be. The only possible way to constitute a European Union, as imagined by
Delors (1992), Monnet (1972) and others, would be to focus for a number of years
(a decade or so) on strengthening the ties between the countries already within the
U~on and then to slowly Ulcorporate other European countries that are interested in
bemg part of the EU.
At the same time, promoting a cultural representation which disassociates
between the notions of state and nation, of political conununity and cultural identity
may co?tribute effccbvely to diminish the impact of nationalism on the European
rntegralion process: This is what Ferry (1990) calls the "postnational identity," which
tmphes a polilical Identity separated from a national identity and built on universal
and transnational principle~. Such an identity could make space for a political power
that would n?: cornclde WIth national sovereignty. This arrangement, could escape
fro~ the ~lIonai nabonaiLSttc 10gtc because the juridical and political order would
be dIsassocIated from national identities.

NOTES
I.

2.

3.

4.

The research that supports this article has been funded by the Holcomb
Research Institute, inruanapolis, the West Ewupean Studies National
Resource Center, Bloomington, inruana, and the National Endowment for the
Humanities, Washington, DC.
TbeEuropean Unio~ sems to continue its COurse towards further integration,
particularly regardmg economIC and monetary union. The 1996
intergovermental Conference has shown that despite a number of difficulties
the EU leaders appear to be determined to achieve full economic and
monetary union for the year 2000.
In all countries the proportion of people employed in the sector services of
the economy swpasses largely people employed in the other sectors. The
proportion of people in higher learning does not ruffer significantly from one
country to another. Structure of the age of the population is also approaching
relatively similar characteristics. The differences in family structures and
morals, are gradually disappearing (divorce rates, number of children per
family, etc.). The variations. in the welfare system (including social security,
unemployment compensatIOns, etc.) are not very large. Furthermore, the
model of "social citizenship state" (Esping-Andersen, 1992) has been
adopted throughout the countries of the European Union.
Nationalism emerged as a symbolic construct in Europe in the eighteenth
century, as part of an intellectual movement preceding the formation of the
nation-states in the continent. Kohn defines it as a collective state of mind
corresponding to a political fact (1948:19); Gerner (1983: 3) describes it as
a theory of political legitimation; and Anderson suggests that nationalism and
nationality are cultural artifacts that once created become an imaginary
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political community (1983: 15). Nationalism in this article is used in the sense
similar to Mann (1990:137), as "an ideology» w~ch asserts the moral,
cultural, and political primacy of an ethnic group (m Its broader acceptabon)
or the people sharing a particular territory and culture.
Weber (1976) suggests that national consciousness is a ~s phenome~on
not an elite creation. However, as the works of several SOCIal SCIentists (I.e.
Anderson 1983, Barker 1927, Connor 1978, S.ruth 1994) show, both
elements are part of the same phenomenon. Indeed, the masses do playa very
important role (often negledted by historians) in the making of a natlo~, but
it is absolutely essential that intellectuals and other people CIrculate the Ideas,
for example, through newspapers and novels in the eighteenth and nmeteenth
cenmries. Those texts, written in the vernacular .languages, allowed theIr
readers to see that other people were sharing theIr Ideas, tastes, and other
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6.

7.
8.

9.

t
cultural expressions.
. . th d·ff,
This actor<enlered approach asswnes that people acting .Wlthin e I eren
. .
(pol"'cal
partt·es " uru·ons business assoclanons,
etc.) affect
the
orgaruzanons
IU
•
•
ways the nation-state and the European Union are per~elved and function.
When the person interviewed is from one of the menuoned regIOns but has
been interviewed in Paris I will indicate the provmce of ongm m bracke~.
· d·lVl·dnal·lD- depth m·terviews were
The structured m
. .used to obtam extensIve
information about the ideas and perceptions of oprruon leaders as well as lay
people as an additional source to the existing data from surveys and other
studies: This research draws also on data from previous ~es ~y the author
(1993) on opinion leaders. The results of the interYlews dId not show
dramatic differences between French and Spaniards concemmg the aspects
addressed in this article. Therefore, the article is wntten m mc!uslve fonn
rather than comparative. In any case, when there are differences between
. .
French and Spaniards, they are clearly stated.
For example, the Cecchini report (1988) estimated between 13 .and 24 bIllIOn
ECU the savings from the abolition of administrative fonnalltle: and border
controls, approximately 17.5 billion ECU the savings from openmg np pubhc
procurement markets, and 2% of the GDP the savmgs from mcreasmg the
scale of production of manufactured goods. Furthermore, accordmg to .these
srudies, planning and cooperation at the European level WIll give ~
comparative advantage through the resulting common ntthzatlon 0

10.

resources.
.
.
d
ed
All the union leaders and workers' representatives I mtervlewe . express
this opinion. Wonnal interviews with lay people revealed also this tendency
to perceive the European Union as an organization at the service of

11.

corporations.
. S . b t
m pam, u not so
The focus on national identity is stronger in France
different that this point requires a particular analYSIS m the context of this
article. Sixty two percent of the French expressed concern for the survIval of

I

12.

I

their national identity within the organization of the European Union, while
56% of Spaniards expressed the same concern.
Among those interviewees who indicated shared culrural symbols with other
conotries of the EU, the consumption of certain products was mentioned. For
instance, a perception of similarity between France, Spain and Italy revolve
around the everyday conswnption of bread and wine. Conswnption is
certainly a factor contributing to an European symbolization, whatever weak
this symbolization may be. As Schudson research suggests, conswner goods
are devices of practical use, but also symbolic StrucTUres that command
attention and evoke allegiance, both for their own sake and from the fact that
they have been shared. People "see and recognize their connections and
distinctions from other people in terms of the goods they consume" (1994:
72).

13.

14.

15.

than

16.

National identity has been traditionally fostered by the school system, the
media, and other state apparatuses to guaranty the cohesion of the nation.
That is, a boundary of inclusion among "us" and of exclusion that
distinguishes "us" from "them." This distinction is present in a large part of
everyday Europeans' interactions, such as trade or spons events.
This should not be generalized to other parts of the world or even to other
countries of Europe. For instance, in Swizerland and in many countries of
Africa and Latin America, language, although very relevant, is not perceived
as the fundamental marker of national identity. And as S.ruth (1971) claims
in Burma and Pakistan the predominant self-definer has been religion. The
rise of linguistic nationalism is often linked to the late eighteen cenrury
Gennany (Edwards 1985, Kedourie 1961), when it was articulated by Fichte
and Herder. However, linguistic nationalism has been on the making for
centuries, or more precisely the notion of linking a particular language to a
given population within a given territory, noder the control of a given
political power, predates at least two centuries the works of Herder (1772)
or Fichte (1807), presented as the most influencial thinkers in the rise of
linguistic nationalism. The creation of acade.rues of the languages in the
sixteen cenrury in Florence (Accade.rua della Crusca in 1582), in the sixteen
cenrury in France (Acade.rue Fran~aise founded in 1635), and at the
beginning of the seventeen cenrury in Spain (Real Acade.rua Espanola
founded in 1713) suggests that there was a strong interests in developing an
homogeneous language for all the areas of the state or empire at that time.
In both countries the opposition to a federal fonn of organization is stronger
among people from the extreme right, and members and sympathisers of the
Commtmist Party. In France, there are powerful sectors of the Gaullist party
that also strongly oppose any fonn of federal organization. In Spain, there is
also a considerable sector of the mainstream Popular Party that opposes a
federal Europe, (as revealed by the interviews with politicans).
Until the beginning of the 1990s decisions were made by unanimity in most
of these areas.

"Il!iI
,J

T
72 International Journal of Contemporary Sociology
17.

18.
19.

20.

21.

22.
23.

24.

25.

26.

The surveys published by the EU show that this is the tendeney in most
countries of the Union. According to Eurobarometer (1995, 1996), roughly,
a little more than half of the population in the EU countries claim to be proEuropean Union.
There were no significant differences on this point according to nationality.
As it is well documented, the nation-states thenselves were established
through centralized systems ofjustice, a central administrative apparatus, and
a common center of political allegiance.
Institutionally speaking, allover the European Union the state is still a
powerful force regulating the economy and affecting to a large extent the
functioning of most organizations and private fInns.
The Commission wanted to produce a social cohesion that would suppon
European integration and to prevent the population from being harmed by the
single market. They realized that success in the social arena would be
necessary for economic and political success. The social policies constitute
a comprehensive set of protections and benefits for employees to supplement
those already existing in the member states.
This was continned by the political leaders I interviewed.
When Ponugal and Spain joined the EU in 1986, not all aspects of their
economy were automatically integrated into the common market Depending
on different arrangements and economic evolution, several years of
adjustment were imposed on different sectors of the economy; fishing was
one of those sectors.
Other imponant cultural links of member states with countries outside the
European Union include France with the Francophone countries of Africa
and America, and S pain with Latin America.
In this process the myths, symbols, and rituals that confonn a cultural
identity playa very imponant role. They are an effective tie of individuals to
their imaginary community. Cultural identity represents the community, but
also the social relations and the positions of individuals within the
community. It is only by the myths, the symbols, and rituals that the nation
becomes perceptible for its members and thai it exists above and beyond the
individual actions. Including in this imaginary the political and geographical
delimitation of the nation in relation to the exterior.
The European Commission has been contemplating actions in the cultural
area for more than 10 years. For instance, in a communication to the
European Parliament (Comision de Las Comunidades Europeas 1988) the
Commission emphasized the need to create a "European cultural space" and
to promote a European audiovisual industry in order 10 develop a European
consciousness among the people of the member countries and to
progressively achieve a citizens' Europe and European Union. TV without
borders, EUREKA, Raphael (Community action in the area of cultural
patrimoine), Kaleidoscope (promotion of the knowledge of different cultures

I
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within the diffe,:nt states and aCknowledgement of the COmmon cultural
bentage), and ~an~ are examples of plans which intend was to reinforce
cultural commurucatJOn ~ong Europeans. These ideas of European cultural
space were. agam considered m the European Union Treaty, signed at
Maastncht m 1992. However, these plans have been only partially applied.
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